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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, various mechanisms of international and
regional justice have developed. The proliferation of international courts,
hybrid tribunals, domestic war crimes chambers, truth commissions, civil
compensation commissions, and other tools of accountability has sparked
an academic debate over the usefulness of any such mechanism for
redressing past violations of international law.' This Article will briefly
discuss some of the best-known mechanisms of international, national, and
"hybrid" justice, and will assess their role in light of the creation and
existence of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the only permanent
tribunal in international criminal law. Does international justice have a
place for ad hoc tribunals, other than the ICC? With the relative successes
of the ICC, will there be a need for additional ad hoc tribunals in the future?
Or, will the ICC replace the need for any additional justice mechanisms and
thus foreclose any future discussions over the establishment of ad hoc
international, regional, or hybrid tribunals?
II. RECENT TRIBUNALS: FROM NUREMBERG TO THE 2 1 T CENTURY
At the end of World War II, victor countries established the famous
Nuremberg Tribunal, where the most prominent leaders of the Nazi regime
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author would like
to thank the International Law Weekend organizers for the opportunity to moderate this outstanding
panel.
I. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003); See
generally, Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute International War Crimes: Proposed
Paradigms and Solutions, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 887 (2006); see generally, David Tolbert, International
Criminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1281 (2009).
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were prosecuted for war crimes, "crimes against humanity," and crimes
against peace.2 Nuremberg has been widely considered a catalyst for more
modem-day tribunals, dedicated to the pursuit of international criminal
justice.3 Recent tribunals fall into three broad categories: International
tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and internationalized or internationally-
supported domestic chambers.4
A. International Tribunals
Three different international tribunals have been established over the
last two decades: The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
ICC.5 All three tribunals are considered international because they employ
international judges, prosecutors, registrars, and defense attorneys. They
apply international law to any case before them and they function
independently of any national jurisdiction.6
The ICTY and the ICTR are ad hoc tribunals, created to deal with
specific conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda with limited
temporal and geographic jurisdictions.7 Both the ICTY and the ICTR are
expected to wind down and complete their operations within the next
decade.8 Both of these tribunals were created through the United Nations
Security Council's Chapter VII powers, as a tool for the reestablishment of
international peace and security in the Balkans and Rwanda. 9 Both of these
tribunals function independently of existing national courts in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and both of these tribunals take primacy over any
national prosecutions.'0 In fact, only those cases that the ICTY and ICTR
2. Tolbert, supra note 1, at 1283-84 (discussing the establishment of the Nuremberg
tribunal).
3. Id.
4. See generally, id.
5. Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons Can be Learned from the Ad Hoc Tribunals?, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 13, 13-14 (2002) (noting the establishing of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)); Lindsey
Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1013, 1015 (2009) (noting the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002).
6. See Tolbert, supra note I, at 1286-87 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of
international tribunals).
7. Id. at 1286.
8. Security Council Report, August 2008 Monthly Forecast,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2008-
08/lookupc.gl(KWLeMTsG b4374795.php?print-true (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
9. Raub, supra note 5, at 1018.
10. Id. (noting that both of these tribunals "were given primacy over national courts.").
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reject can be handed down for prosecution at the national level." Much
academic debate has already occurred over the impact, role, and usefulness
of these Tribunals. 2 While scholars disagree about these issues, it is
indisputable that these Tribunals have contributed to the development of
international criminal law. Their future utility, however, remains limited
because of their mandatory completion strategy and their inability to extend
jurisdiction over other geographic areas. 13
The ICC Statute was negotiated in 1998; the Court became operational
in 2002 and has investigated seven cases and situations since its inception.
14
The ICC is the only permanent international criminal court. 5  It has
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 16 It
will potentially have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in 2017, if a
sufficient number of state parties ratify the appropriate amendments to the
existing statute. 17 While many have applauded the creation of the ICC as a
tremendous development in the field of international criminal law, others
have remained skeptical about its ability to accomplish many of the existing
goals of international justice.' 8 The ICC has limited resources and can only
prosecute a handful of cases. 19 Its jurisdiction is limited temporally, to
2002 onward, and its ability to hear any case depends on its ability to
properly acquire power over a situation-the Court can exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to a Security Council referral, pursuant to a referral by a state
11. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes oftHate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 365, 386 (1999) (noting that under the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, "at any stage of the procedure
the international tribunal may order national courts to defer to its competence and release a suspect to its
custody for trial.").
12. See, e.g., Raub, supra note 5, at 1017-23; Tolbert, supra note 1, at 1285-87; Wierda,
supra note 5, at 13-17.
13. Security Council Report, supra note 8.
14. See, e.g., James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of
Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VILLA L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2009) (describing the establishment
of the ICC); International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%2and%2cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited
Feb. 23, 2013).
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id.
17. Mauro Politi, The ICC and the Crime of Aggression: A Dream that Came Through and the
Reality Ahead, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 267. 280 (2012).
18. See generally, Tim Curry, Review of Conference: International Criminal Tribunals in the
21st Century, 13 No. I HUM. RTs. BRIEF 6 (2005); see generally, Simi Singh, The Future of
International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court (ICC), 10 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 1
(2000).
19. Singh, supra note 18, at 9.
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party, or pursuant to the prosecutor's decision to initiate an investigation.2 °
In some instances, political forces and influences may prevent the Court
from investigating a case.21  Finally, the ICC functions based on the
'"complementarity' principle"; it can only exercise jurisdiction if a state is
unwilling or unable to prosecute.22 Thus, national prosecutions have
primacy over prosecutions in the ICC, unlike in the case of the ICTY and
ICTR, where prosecutions in the ad hoc tribunals have primacy over any
national prosecution.23 In some instances, the ICC has been criticized as
impeding peace by promoting international justice.24 For example, in
Uganda and Sudan, where the Court has launched investigations, some have
argued that its involvement has contributed toward further ethnic conflict
and violence, and that other modes of accountability would have been better
suited for such volatile situations.25 Thus, the model of hybrid tribunals has
developed as a supplemental mechanism of justice in areas outside of the
ICC's reach and in situations where ICC involvement would not be
beneficial for a variety of geo-political reasons.26
B. Hybrid Tribunals
Hybrid tribunals are courts that combine elements of international and
national prosecutions. They employ a mix of international and national
judges; they apply both international and domestic criminal laws; they may
be located in a host country whose violent past they may be attempting to
address; and they strive to fulfill goals of international justice while also
helping to promote the growth of the local judiciary, court system, and civil
society in general.27 Recent examples of these hybrid tribunals include the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) of the
20. Id. at 8-9 (discussing the limitations of the ICC).
21. Id. at 9.
22. Tolbert supra note 1, at 1288.
23. Id. at 1288-89 (noting that "the ICC is the reverse of the situation of the ICTY and ICTR,
which have primacy over local jurisdiction," because of the "complementarity principle.").
24. Id. at 1291 ("[l]t is argued that by insisting on the primacy of ICC investigations, peaceful
resolutions of disputes can be discourage, as leaders facing war crimes investigations or charges are
unlikely to agree to make peace, because they have little incentive to do so.").
25. Id.
26. See generally, id. at 1285.
27. See generally, Raub, supra note 5, at 1023-25.
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Dili District Court (East Timor), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),
and the Kosovo Regulation 64 Panels.28
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2002, through
an international agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone,
the host country.29 The Court has jurisdiction over atrocities that took place
in 1996 during Sierra Leone's civil war.3° It is located in Freetown, the
capital of Sierra Leone, but employs a mix of international and local
judges.3t Its statute includes both international law offenses and crimes
derived from Sierra Leone, which are specific to the conflict that ravaged
this small nation for many years.32 The most prominent defendant
prosecuted in the Special Court is Charles Taylor, the former President of
Liberia, who was accused of supporting violent rebel groups in Sierra
Leone during the 1990s. 33 Although the Special Court had formulated a
firm completion strategy, the tribunal has extended its own existence
several times and is, as of today, still operational.34 Many have described
the Court as a model hybrid tribunal. Some scholars have hailed it as a
successful model of international justice, which has managed to overcome
many short fallings of true international tribunals, like the ICTY or ICTR.35
The ECCC was established in 2003, through an agreement between the
United Nations Secretary-General and the Cambodian government in order
to try the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime for atrocities
committed between 1975 and 1979 when Pol Pot ruled Cambodia and
orchestrated a series of devastating policies, which resulted in the death of
almost a third of the country's population.36 The ECCC is composed of a
Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and a Supreme Court Chamber; all the
chambers consist of international as well as Cambodian judges.37 The
Court also has an international and a domestic prosecutor.38 The Court's
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1034.
30. Id. at 1035.
31. Id. at 1034-35.
32. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uCndMJeEw/3d&tabid=176 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013); Dickinson,
supra note 1, at 300.
33. Raub, supra note 5, at 1035.
34. Id. at 1035-36.
35. See generally, id. at 1015.
36. Id. at 1031-32.
37. Id. at 1033.
38. Raub, supra note 5, at 1033.
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statute is a mix of international and domestic law offenses,39 similar to the
statute of the aforementioned Special Court for Sierra Leone. Since 2009,
the ECCC, located in the capital city of Phnom Pen, has prosecuted several
high level members of the Khmer Rouge regime.40 The ECCC is a model
hybrid tribunal:
As with the hybrid institutions in Kosovo and East Timor, the
weakened state of the Cambodian judiciary from years of civil
war and the international nature of the crimes to be prosecuted
led the government to believe that international participation was
necessary to ensure that the trials met international standards of
justice.41
Following the East Timorese struggle for independence from
Indonesia, during which conflicts between pro-Indonesian militias and pro-
independence forces resulted in violence, death, and destruction, the United
Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) established
the SPSC to investigate and try cases related to the conflict.42 The Panels
were empowered with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, torture, sexual violence, and murder (a mix of international and
domestic crimes) committed in East Timor between January 1, 1999 and
October 25, 1999.43 The SPSC were staffed with a mix of international and
domestic judges and placed within the East Timorese domestic legal
system; appeals were also structured to be lodged within the domestic
appellate system.44 Between 2000 and 2005, the SPSC completed fifty-five
trials, and in 2005, the United Nations Security Council decided to close
down this tribunal, although several investigations were still pending.45
The UNTAET has provided various forms of assistance to the SPSC over
the years,46 and this Tribunal, like the Special Court for Sierra Leone and
the ECCC, represents a model of hybrid justice-a tribunal created within a
39. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), available at
http-./www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documentLKR Law-as-amended_27 Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.
40. Raub, supra note 5, at 1032.
41. Id. at 1033.
42. David Cohen, "Hybrid" Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: "Lessons
Learned" and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (2007).
43. Id.
44. Raub, supra note 5, at 1030.
45. Cohen, supra note 42, at 9.
46. Raub, supra note 5, at 1029.
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domestic system of a post-war nation assisted by the international
community.
47
The STL was created in 2007 by the Security Council to try persons
responsible for assassinations, and those attempted, of prominent Lebanese
political and media figures since 2004.48 In particular, the STL is
investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
49
Because of security concerns, the STL is located at The Hague, unlike the
aforementioned tribunals, which have all been located in host countries. 50
The Tribunal is composed of both international and Lebanese judges, but it
will apply Lebanese law.51 Also, unlike the aforementioned hybrid
tribunals, which have jurisdiction over both international and national
crimes, the STL has jurisdiction solely over national crimes, as they relate
to the Hariri assassination and other assassination attempts.52  Thus, this
Tribunal will not investigate "traditional" international crimes, such as
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, but instead will focus on
terrorism. 53 The STL has a three-year mandate, which can be extended by
the Security Council upon review.5 4 The Tribunal began its work in 2009,
and it has already investigated several individuals and issued one
indictment.15 The STL is different from the hybrid tribunals because it was
created through the Security Council Chapter VII powers, but contains
similarities because its creation was requested by the Lebanese government
and because the tribunal employs so many features of domestic Lebanese
law.56
After years of conflict in Kosovo, the United Nations Missions in
Kosovo (UNMIK) "passed several regulations permitting foreign judges to
sit alongside domestic judges on existing Kosovar courts and allowing
47. Id. at 1041-43.
48. See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 757 (May 30, 2007); see also International Center
for Transitional Justice, Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 10, available at
http://www.ictj.org/images/content9/l/914.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
49. Kim Ghattas, Lebanon's Groundbreaking Tribunal, BBC News, Apr. 21, 2006, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/4926536.stm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
50. Raub, supra note 5, at 1038.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1039
53. Id. at 1038.
54. See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007), art. 21.
55. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon's pre-trial judge confirmed an indictment in the case of
Ayyash et al., STL-l 1-01, on June 28, 2011, see Special Tribunal for Lebanon, The Cases, available at
http://www.stl-tsl.orglen/the-cases (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
56. Raub, supra note 5, at 1039.
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foreign lawyers to partner with domestic lawyers to prosecute and defend
the cases. 57  Under UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General obtained the authority to appoint
an international prosecutor, judge, or panel of judges, upon the request of a
prosecutor, an accused, or defense counsel, resulting in the creation of a
Regulation 64 Panel.58 Thus, the Kosovar Regulation 64 Panels are unlike
the hybrid tribunals because they do not derive their authority from treaty
law or from Security Council resolutions; instead, their authority is based
on UNMIK regulations. 59 These Panels are similar to other hybrid tribunals
because they apply a blend of international and domestic law and because
international judges and prosecutors have worked alongside Kosovar
Albanian colleagues. The Panels have been overseen by UNMIK
authorities and are accordingly financed.60 As of 2002, the Kosovo Panels
have held seventeen war crimes trials.61 Some have argued that the Kosovo
Regulation 64 Panels represent a somewhat successful model of hybrid
tribunals: "The presence of international judges imparted an air of
credibility to these trials that would have been missing without international
involvement while at least some Kosovar judges have benefited from
exposure to their international counterparts. 62
C. Internationally-Supported Domestic Chambers
In addition to hybrid tribunals, which reflect a melange of international
law and domestic law, another model of delivering justice for war crimes
and other types of atrocities has developed over the last decade:
Internationally-supported domestic chambers or "internationalized"
domestic tribunals. Examples include the Iraqi Special Court, the Bosnian
War Chamber, and the recent Somali piracy prosecutions in Kenya and the
Seychelles.
In order to prosecute Saddam Hussein, the deposed leader of Iraq, as
well as other members of his regime, the Iraqi Special Tribunal was
established in 2003 through an Iraqi law approved by the United States.
63
57. Id. at 1026.
58. OXFORD, INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR,
KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 34, (Cesare P. R. Romano, Andre Nollkaemper, & Jann K. Kleffner eds.,
2004).
59. Raub, supra note 5, at 1027.
60. Id. at 1027-28.
61. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 297.
62. Raub, supra note 5, at 1028.
63. See Cherif M. Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 327, 335-36 (2005).
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Located in Baghdad, the Court is a domestic tribunal that employs domestic
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and applies Iraqi law. 64 The tribunal
was heavily supported by the international community, particularly the
United States, which provided various forms of support and training for the
Court's personnel. 65 Thus, this tribunal is a model of an "internationalized"
domestic court: A justice mechanism embedded in the domestic system of
the relevant nation, aided by various international organizations and
authorities in order to enhance its effectiveness.66 The Iraqi Special
Tribunal successfully convicted Saddam Hussein, and in addition, has
prosecuted several other members of the deposed Ba'athist regime.67
The Bosnian War Chamber is a specialized domestic chamber that
handles various war crimes cases, either handed down by the ICTY as part
of its completion strategy, or investigated on its own.68 These cases stem
from the civil war in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990S.69 The
Chamber is a domestic tribunal within the Bosnian judicial system; it
applies local law and it is located in capital city of Sarajevo. 70 The
Chamber, however, employs a mix of international staff, as well as local
Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. 71 Like the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the
Bosnian War Chamber has benefitted from generous international support,
and its processes have been "internationalized" to ensure procedural quality
of prosecutions and to guarantee the delivery of justice pursuant to
international standards.72
Finally, more recent examples of internationalized domestic chambers
include special piracy courts in Kenya and the Seychelles, where captured
Somali pirates are being transferred for prosecution under the national
64. See generally, id at 346.
65. Id. at 341 (discussing the role of American jurists in the Iraqi Special Tribunal).
66. See generally, id. at 346.
67. Saddam Hussein Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/6117910.stm (last updated on Nov. 5 2006).
68. Tolbert, supra note 1, at 1294 (noting that the ICTY has transferred a number of low and
mid-level cases to national courts and that most of these cases went to the Bosnian war chamber, which
is a national hybrid court).
69. Id. at 1285.
70. See generally, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Introduction to Balkan War Crimes
Court, available at http://iwpr.net/programme/intemational-justice-icty/introduction-bakan-war-crimes-
courts (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
71. Curry, supra note 18, at 18.
72. Id. (noting that the Bosnian war crimes trials have been monitored by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and that the experiment was successful).
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systems of these two countries.73 A piracy chamber has developed in
Mombasa, Kenya, where several successful prosecutions have taken place
since 2006.74 Kenyan piracy courts are domestic; they also employ Kenyan
lawyers, apply Kenyan law, and are located in this host nation.7" In the
Seychelles, piracy prosecutions have been taking place since 2009 in the
Supreme Court located in the capital city of Victoria.76 The Seychellois
prosecutions are conducted using local law by Seychellois judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys.77 The piracy prosecutions in both
Kenya and the Seychelles have benefited from international assistance by
the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, which has provided both
monetary and logistical support, as well as personnel in the form of
"loaned" prosecutors, defense attorneys, translators, and interpreters. 78 in
this sense, piracy prosecutions in Kenya and the Seychelles, although
conducted in national courts, have been "internationalized," due to support
and involvement by the United Nations.
Hybrid tribunals and internationalized domestic chambers have
supplemented available mechanisms of justice in international criminal law,
specifically international tribunals. 9  The Nuremberg model of
international war crimes prosecutions has been appended in modem times
with innovative prosecutorial models, which mix international and domestic
law and may be oriented toward both restoring justice and rebuilding peace
in war-tom areas.
80
III. THE FUTURE: A MILANGE OF INTERNATIONAL, AD Hoc HYBRID, AND
"INTERNATIONALIZED" DOMESTIC TRIBUNALS
Is the ICC a panacea for international criminal justice, or does the
future hold room and space for other kinds of tribunals, including ad hoc
hybrid courts and internationalized domestic chambers? The latter is most
likely true.
73. For a general discussion of piracy prosecutions in Kenya and the Seychelles, see Milena
Sterio, Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: The Argument for Pirate Prosecutions in the National Courts of
Kenya, The Seychelles, and Mauritius, 4 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 104 (2012).
74. Id. at 112.
75. See generally, id. at 112-13.
76. Id. at 115.
77. Id. at 115-16.
78. UNODC and Piracy, available at httpJl/www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/
index.htrnl?ref-menuside (last visited Feb 18, 2013).
79. See generally, id.
80. See generally, Tolbert, supra note 1.
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Each of the three models of delivering international justice offer both
advantages and disadvantages. International tribunals provide a mode of
delivering true international justice based on international law and carried
out by the most experienced and influential international lawyers.81 Their
general deterrent effect, impact, and legacy are potentially tremendous, and
their case law may form the basis for developing international criminal law
in the future.82 International tribunals, however, have limited resources but
demand extremely expensive prosecutions; typically, they are structured to
prosecute only those who bear the highest level of responsibility in any
conflict, and they may be divorced from the reality of any situation that
they are investigating because of their physical distance from the conflict at
hand and their disconnect with local law.83 Moreover, international
tribunals generally only have jurisdiction over three international offenses:
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.84 Thus, these tribunals
may not be able to investigate other important crimes which may have
taken place during a conflict, further contributing to a perception of
disconnect between the tribunal and the affected country. 85  Finally,
international tribunals are typically not concerned with rebuilding civil
society in war-ravaged countries that they investigate; instead, their focus is
on prosecuting the offenders and satisfying the goals of international
justice. 86 Particularly with the ICC, scholars have argued that in some
instances, its investigations have undermined the stability and peace-
building processes in target nations.87 Many have argued that the ICTY and
ICTR have had a very limited influence on the rebuilding of stability and
81. See generally, International War Crimes Tribunals, Beyond Intractability, July 2003
available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/int-war-crime-tribunals (last visited on. Feb.
23, 2013).
82. Leiber Code, available at http://www.liebercode.org/2012/03/precedent-and-stare-decisis-
at.html (last visited on Feb. 23, 2013) (noting the potential for "stare decises" at the international
tribunals); see also, International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY (Gideon
Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003).
83. See, e.g., Tolbert, supra note 1, at 1287 (noting that international tribunals are "expensive
and slow and have no real connection to the affected communities, because they are far away from the
locations where the crimes have been committed;" noting also that "their impact on, and support of, the
development of local judicial infrastructure has been limited.").
84. Id. at 1286.
85. See generally, id. at 1287.
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society in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.88 Thus, while offering
certain advantages, international tribunals present challenges and
insufficiencies in terms of delivering justice for all on a global scale.
Hybrid tribunals offer advantages inherent to their approach of
integrating aspects of international prosecutions with national justice
systems. 89 Typically, hybrid tribunals are located in the host nations, and
therefore can function in tune with the needs of the local society.90 They
often contribute toward the growth of the local judiciary and the
redevelopment of the national criminal justice system.9' Similarly, they
often provide the host nation with much-needed infrastructure, such as new
buildings, courthouses, and detention facilities.92 Hybrid tribunals are less
expensive than international tribunals, they can arguably prosecute more
offenders, and they can tailor their statutes to existing conflicts by
incorporating country-specific offenses.93 Hybrid tribunals, however, are
not immune to criticism. They may lack in legacy and standing when
compared to international tribunals, in particular the ICC.94  They may
deliver justice at a sub-international level, and their focus on rebuilding
civil society may detract them from focusing on the actual prosecutions.95
They may be inadequately funded and experience internal tension due to
conflicts between the international and domestic court personnel.96
Finally, internationalized domestic chambers offer advantages such as
the ability to prosecute lower-level offenders, handing a large volume of
cases, contributing toward rebuilding the local judiciary, and existing in
sync with the needs of the local population.97 Such chambers typically
deliver justice at much lower costs and at much higher speed compared to
88. See generally, Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide
Adequate Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353 (2001).




93. See Raub, supra note 5, at 1023 (noting that the budget of the ICTY for 2009-2010 was
approximately $173.7 million per year, and that the budget of the ICTR for the same year was
approximately $133.7 million per year); Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1025 (noting that the Special Court
for Sierra Leone had a budget of approximately $89 million per year); see also Tolbert, supra note 1, at
1287 (noting that hybrid tribunals have operated at lower cost than international tribunals because the
former employ national staff in lower-cost environments).
94. See generally, Raub, supra note 5.
95. Id. at 1025.
96. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 1, at 300-05 (discussing three general problems related to
hybrid tribunals: legitimacy; capacity-building; and norm-penetration).
97. See generally, Id. at 308-09.
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international and hybrid tribunals. Yet, such chambers raise challenging
issues as well. Some have questioned their ability to implement
prosecutions that are adequate under the standards of international justice.
For example, European nations withdrew their support for the Iraqi Special
Court because they argued that its adoption of the death penalty was
contrary to human rights law. 98
In addition, domestic chambers can be prone to corruption. In Kenya,
the UNODC donated millions of dollars to support piracy prosecutions in
Mombasa, but allegations surfaced that Kenyan politicians mishandled the
money and greedily demanded more.99  Domestic chambers do not
necessarily contribute toward the development of international criminal law
because they function within domestic legal systems and apply purely
domestic law. Some have argued that the international community, instead
of supporting domestic prosecutions, should contribute directly to the
rebuilding of these war-torn areas by developing the local economy,
infrastructure, and educational institutions.'00
Ultimately, the model of justice that should be employed for a given
country or region depends on the circumstances of each situation. While
the ICC may be the best prosecutorial option for high-profile conflicts and
offenders, such as genocide or crimes against humanity, other conflicts may
necessitate the creation of ad hoc international tribunals, such as the ICTY
and ICTR, or ad hoc hybrid tribunals, like the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the ECCC, the East Timor, or Kosovo courts. Other conflicts may
warrant the creation of a specialized and internationally supported domestic
war crimes chamber, such as in the case of the Iraqi Special Court, the
Bosnian War Crimes Chamber, and the Somali piracy prosecutions in the
national courts of Kenya and the Seychelles. In light of the different
demands of each conflict, is it unlikely that the existence of the ICC will
preclude the establishment of other types of hybrid or internationalized
domestic tribunals.' 10
98. Neil MacDonald, Iraq Tribunal Struggles for Credibility, FT.COM, June 10, 2005, available at
http//www.l.comfmtl/cms/sl/tfbc3ae76-d94d-l1d9-8403-0000e251 lc8.html#axzz2LjuFZTJ9 (last visited
Feb.23, 2013.)
99. Sterio, supra note 73, at 113-14 (discussing alleged corruption issues in Kenya).
100. See e.g., Dickinson, supra note 1, at 308 (describing that some critics have labeled hybrid
courts as "a mere second best alternative to international courts.").
101. Id. at 308-10 (outlining instances in which the establishment of hybrid courts may be
warranted).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The goals of international justice are broad and necessitate different
approaches for different situations. While the creation of the ICC may have
been a welcomed development in the field of international criminal law,
this Tribunal should not prevent the possible establishment of other future
tribunals necessary for various types of conflicts, crimes, and offenders.
